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Greece is viewed by the West as the cradle of 
democracy harking to the era of the glory of An­
cient Athens. Both Greeks and western Gre- 
cophiles overlook the fact that the philosophic 
roots of modern western democracy with its em­
phasis on individual rights and individual self- 
interest within a state constituted to enhance the 
pursuit of individual happiness with minimal gov­
ernmental interference stems from the modem 
political philosophers, while an evolving free 
market structure overthrew the bonds of 
feudalism thus providing the requisite institutional 
framework. The underpinnings of the bourgeoisie 
state do not rest either on the philosophic prem­
ises of Plato and Aristotle or on the social con­
ditions prevalent in Ancient Greece. Aristotle 
feared mobocracy and lauded submission of the 
individual to the group, be it the clan or «polis»; 
in fact, an individual had no existence qua indi­
vidual. Plato, on the other hand, justified the ul­
timate right of the state to suppress dissidents 
since the individual owes his existence to and 
was a product of the state.1 For the Ancients, to 
exile an individual from his «polis» was the ulti­
mate sanction since he was bereft of family and 
home. It is Plato and Aristotle2 with a later ad­
mixture of the mysticism, and the fatalism of 
Byzantium—that is the legacy of the modern 
Greeks—a far cry from the cradle of western 
democracy.
Greece never experienced the Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment which engulfed western Eu­
rope. The revival of learning, the intellectual and 
artistic ferment of the 15th-18th centuries, the 
French «philosophes» of the 17th century had no 
counterpart in Greece. Most of what is geograph­
ically Greece today was a neglected province of 
the Ottoman Empire during the 16th, 17th and 
18th centuries. Not only did Greece remain un­
touched by the intellectual currents of western 
Europe but it failed to undergo the revolutionary 
socio-economic changes which transformed west­
ern Europe from feudalism to a multiplicity of 
bourgeois nation-states. The legacy which the 
Renaissance presented modem Greece was a 
ready-made Greek nationalist ideology. The 
Renaissance’s revival and mythologizing of the 
Ancients and their philosophy, provided the 
Greek nationalist leaders of the early 19th century 
with an ideology proclaiming their descent from
1. In fact students of Socrates would have executed poets 
for their views and their possible disruption of the «good» 
society.
2. Greek schools of philosophy that rejected Platonic and 
Aristotelian notions, such as the Sophists and Epicureans, 
nevertheless did not develop the concept of «individualism» of 
relevance to the civil or political society.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:03:46 |
the impact of traditional cultural paieras on Greek politics
the Ancients and their inherent superiority.1
In marked contrast to those who view Greece 
as the fountain-head of democracy, some analysts 
have characterized the modern Greek political 
system as one dominated by political clientelism 
whose roots are deep in traditional Greek society. 
As such, Greek politics are viewed as non- 
ideological and issueless, operative both within 
the framework of a parliamentary system and of 
military rule.2 However, to the extent that clien­
telism is descriptive of the modern Greek political 
system, patron-client relations must be scrutinized 
within the context of Greece’s philosophic and 
ideological foundations and its economic realities. 
On a descriptive level, patron-client relations are 
manifest in societies as disparate as India, 
Nigeria, Japan and Greece, but in each case the 
cultural context varies. Cultural patterns in turn 
are rooted in the philosophic premises of a par­
ticular society which are embodied in its prevail­
ing ideology, norms and values. This complex 
constitutes part of a society’s givens which are 
often ignored and hence excluded from analytic 
inquiry. In order to gain greater insight into polit­
ical clientelism therefore it is essential to investi­
gate the values, norms and belief systems which 
condition the functioning of the clientelisi net­
works in particular societies.
the Greek view of self
Traditionally in Greece, the Greek view of self 
and of his relations with others and with the 
world around him, have precluded the notion of 
the existence of an individual qua individual. He 
is an integral -part of a greater whole and has no 
existence as a separate person. The primary 
reference group for Greeks which has determined 
his values, norms and behavior, has been the 
extended family. An individual’s worth has been 
measured in terms of his adherence to the highest 
moral value, «philotimo», which literally means 
love of honor, honor being defined in a partic­
ularly «Greek» fashion. «Philotimo» is the Greek 
term for the experiencing of oneself as part of a 
system of group relatedness: «...it is the domi­
nant Greek value which has integrated all other 
values and norms, defines appropriate behavior
1. William St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free, Lon­
don: Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 13-22, discusses the 
discrepancy between the perception of Greece by western 
Europeans and the realities of Greece at the time of the out­
break of the Greek War of Independence in 1821
2. Keith Legg, Politics of Modern Greece, Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1969.
towards other group members and towards 
foreigners.»3
Essential to philotimo is what to a westerner 
would appear as different ethical standards ap­
plicable to the members of an extended family 
and to those in the remainder of the environment. 
Lying, cheating, dishonesty are immoral actions 
vis-a-vis family members, but moral vis-a-vis for­
eigners. Within the traditional Greek framework, 
however, this is not a double standard, it is a uni­
fied ethical system stemming from the Greek 
conceptual framework whereby social reality is 
structured differently and hence experienced dif­
ferently than in the West.4 Philotimo, for which 
there is no English equivalent, measures a man’s 
worth in terms of his success in fulfilling kinship 
obligations and in protecting the extended family 
from real or imaginary threats emanating from a 
hostile physical and human environment.5 De­
fense of the interests and honor of the family in­
clude efforts to enhance its status and economic 
position. Since «goods» have been perceived as 
«-· fixed or limited in quantity, a benefit accruing to 
one particular family is perceived by others as 
diminishing their prospects for gain.
Significantly, despite recent socio-economic 
changes, «philotimo» has tended to persist among 
large sections of the population. Rapid urbaniza­
tion particularly since the end of World War II, 
for example, although it has resulted in a break­
down in some intra-family obligations such as 
living arrangements, has left untouched the basic 
psychological bonds. Living quarters restricted 
to the nuclear family have become common, in 
contrast to traditional arrangements whereby sev­
eral generations lived under the same roof. But 
reciprocal familial obligations have not been al­
tered nor has the notion that a code of behavior 
moral within the family can be immoral vis-a-vis 
foreigners. The experiencing of shame rather than 
guilt persists, guilt being a mechanism regulating 
behavior when individuals relate intra-individually 
and shame when individuals relate inter- 
individually. A failure to behave in accordance 
with the requirements of philotimo, whatever the 
socio-economic context, does not engender feel-
3. Adamantia Pollis, «Political Implications of the Modem 
Greek Concept of Self», British Journal of Sociology, March 
1965, p. 34.
4. A traditional Greek would not experience the value con­
tradictions discussed in Aaron Esterson, The Leaves of 
Spring, England: Penguin Books, 1972, for what appears as 
contradictory in one cultural context may not be so in an­
other.
5. It should not be inferred that the extended family lives in 
harmony. When latent hostility and distrust become overt, a 
not infrequent event, family unity disintegrates; enemy camps 
are formed and conflict becomes intense and vituperative.
3
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ings of guilt but feelings of shame since others 
view him as a failure.
Philotimo as discussed above essentially relates 
to the appropriate behavior for men. For women 
philotimo is not as potent a value and has differ­
ent behavioral consequences. Greek society is 
heavily male oriented and women have been 
treated as objects in the males’ environment. 
Women, like men, are integral parts of an ex­
tended family, but in addition to the definition of 
self in terms of this group, her self is further de­
fined in terms of the male members of the family, 
in relation to whom she is subordinate throughout 
her life. Man’s fulfillment is achieved by activity 
in the outside political, economic and social world 
aimed at furthering the interests of the extended 
family. A woman’s fulfillment is achieved in mar­
riage, and the extended family circumscribes the 
confines within which her life is lived. Within the 
family the specific role of women has been to 
provide for the needs of men by assuming re­
sponsibility for the household, to be reflective of 
their views and supportive of their action and by 
raising children.
Semnotis (modesty) is the highest virtue a 
woman can possess. It presupposes the absence 
of individuality and implies submissiveness, 
deference towards males and the absence of per­
sonal drives or desires. Traditionally a young girl 
who exhibited an independent will, was consid­
ered to have a character flaw, of lacking sem­
notis and hence the requisite behavior of obedi­
ence and withdrawal, thus diminishing her 
chances for marriage. Therefore, the demands of 
philotimo for a woman were fulfilled if she be­
haved with semnotis, and was obedient and 
docile. Although obedience to authority is a gen­
eral value within the Greek framework, it is of 
greater psychological potency for women as is 
evidenced in a recent survey conducted in the 
urban centers of Greece. Recent decades have 
witnessed apparently significant changes in the 
role of women. Increasing numbers are obtaining 
an education equivalent to males, and increasing' 
numbers are entering the labor market, particu­
larly prior to marriage. Nevertheless obedience 
was listed by women as the most important be­
havioral consequence of philotimo by contrast to 
male respondents who considered it less 
significant.1
Additional values and norms subsumed under 
philotimo as applied to men include the inadmis- 
sability of personal assumption of responsibility
1. Vasso G. Vassiliou and George Vassiliou, «The Implica­
tive Meaning of the Greek Concept of Philotimo», Journal of 
Cross-Cultural Psychology, Voi. 4, No. 3, September 1973, p. 
337.
for failures or the concession of errors. Admis­
sion of personal blame for inability to obtain a 
job, or for one’s immorality or for that of a 
member of one’s family, would be psychologically 
devastating: it would shatter the self. Such ac­
tions would indicate the absence of «philotimo», 
it would permit the hostile outside world to treat 
one with scorn and derision, which in turn would 
engender painful, unbearable feelings of shame. 
Concurrently, Greeks believe that they have no 
control over their environment or their destiny. 
There is nothing more reflective of the sense of 
fatalism that permeates the culture than Greek 
laic (populist) music. The suffering and anguish of 
man’s fate—unrequited love, betrayal, poverty 
—are the central themes of the lyrics. It is others 
who have betrayed, it is fate that has made one 
poor and there is no escape from one’s destiny. 
Just as responsibility for failures in one’s personal 
life, is projected externally, there is a tendency to 
externalize responsibility for political develop­
ments. Given the premises of philotimo which 
preclude admission of error and the simultaneous 
sense of impotence, Greeks tend not to assume 
responsibility for political or economic failure but 
to blame the elements, fate or malicious enemies.
historical experience and authoritarianism
Banfield in his study of Calabria, Italy, de­
scribes the origins of a cultural pattern similar to 
the Greek, of familial amoralism, as he labels it, 
to the initial scarcity of resources in the region, 
making intense competition among families a mat­
ter of survival.2 Without delving into the histori­
cal origin of a similar pattern of atomized group 
competitiveness in Greece, it should be indicated 
that several factors in the historical experience of 
Greeks have contributed to the persistence of the 
extended family as the primary reference group; 
to the persistence of the perception of the world 
as hostile; and to man’s inability to affect the 
course of events. Buttressed by the classical leg­
acy which provided a conceptual framework, or 
cosmology, the empirical reality of economic 
scarcity over the centuries has reinforced competi­
tion among atomized family groups for the avail­
able scare resources. In turn Byzantium superim­
posed on Greek culture a religiosity permeated 
with fatalism and other-worldliness. Istanbul 
(Constantinople) became a glittering capital; a 
priestly class was established whose upper ech­
elons possessed immense power and status, while
2. Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Soci­
ety, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959.
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the territory of what is now Greece became the 
neglected and poverty ridden backwaters of an 
Empire. Subsequent Ottoman rule beginning in 
1453 changed little in the life of the ordinary 
peasant except to add another class of both Mus­
lin and Christian tax gatherers and to further 
strengthen the power of the Orthodox Church. In 
fact during the latter years of the Ottoman Em­
pire the exploitation of the peasantry by the tax 
gatherers increased.1
The response of the peasantry to the perceived 
social reality during Ottoman rule was individual 
family supplications to the authorities—demoge- 
rontes and priests—for intervention with the 
tax gatherers in order to obtain a reduction of their 
individual tax burden. The millet system, whereby 
the Orthodox priests were the intermediaries 
and the liaison between Christian and Ottoman 
officialdom, defined the institutional framework 
within which a peasant society functioned, 
and set the foundations for the subsequent devel­
opment of political clientelism when a modern 
state was established. In modem Greece, within 
the context of a contemporary political institu­
tional framework, be it parliamentary rule, or mil­
itary dictatorship, the notion of scarcity and 
the pressure to «survive» either psychologically 
or econpmically, has persisted. To be virtuous, to 
fulfill one’s moral obligations to one’s family and 
to behave with «philotimo», men have continued 
to look to those with status and power as the ap­
propriate channel for furthering their personal 
(family) goals and interests.
The historical evolution of Greece and the fail­
ure of the Greek War of Independence from Ot­
toman rule in 1821 to modernize or to bring 
significant changes in social structure, perpetuated 
the hierarchical structure of society in which 
power continued to reside in the traditional local 
elites,2 The perceived impotence of the indi­
vidual to control his environment and to affect his 
family’s destiny persisted. Thus the only path 
open for survival and possible improvement con­
tinued to be dependence on those with power 
who commanded more resources and were in a 
position to affect one’s well-being. The modem 
state, formed in 1830, by not altering the pre­
existing social structure preserved the dominance
1. For a discussion of increased provincial exploitation 
which led at a later time to the Tanzimat Reforms, see 
Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 
1856-1876, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1962, in particular the early chapters.
2. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Political Modernization, So­
cial Conflict and Cultural Cleavage in the Formation of the 
Modern Greek State, 1821-1827, unpublished dissertation, Co­
lumbia University, 1972.
of face to face relations and hence personalized 
politics, a necessary precondition for clientelism 
to operate. Abstract concepts such as equality be­
fore the law and impartial justice have had little 
meaning, or rather they have acquired substance 
and significance only as judgments of individual 
actions in terms of traditional reciprocal obliga­
tions. In turn, the Greek attitude towards the au­
thorities on whom they are dependent has been 
one of deference and submission.
The «realistic» restraints on challenging author­
ity have been further reinforced by a socializing 
process transmitted through the family and 
schools, whereby deference to authority is inter­
nalized and an open face to face confrontation 
becomes psychologically well nigh impossible. Au­
thority figures have been manifold: male heads of 
families, clergy, military officers, bureaucrats and 
politicians. While defining reality in terms of 
hierarchical reciprocal personal obligations has 
persisted, the object to whom deference has been 
accorded has shifted and altered depending upon 
the prevailing social and political order. Defer­
ence is not necessarily accorded to traditional au­
thorities but to whomever possesses status and 
power, who in turn is «legitimately» entitled to 
privileges not accessible to the many. Egalitarian­
ism, therefore, at least as understood in the West, 
has not been a traditional Greek value. The mean­
ing of equality in Greece has not been equality of 
opportunity, nor equality in terms of human 
rights, nor equality as a natural endowment; it is 
equality in terms of a man’s worth and the 
criteria of worth is that of a virtuous man, a man 
who behaves with «philotimo». In this sense the 
rich and the poor, the lowly and the mighty can 
be equal. For women the concept of equality is 
irrelevant in any set of terms since they are view­
ed as inferior.
Societies possess an underlying cognitive struc­
ture and a central core of norms and values for 
the psychological functioning of individuals, for 
the structuring of social relations and for defining 
social reality,3 which are resistant to change 
while other values, peripheral to the core con­
cepts, are far more amenable to change. Faced 
with a similar set of physical or environmental 
«realities» different peoples can evolve differing 
understandings of these «realities» and formulate 
varying concepts and norms governing their rela­
tions with each other and with physical objects.
3. For an excellent discussion of the creation of 
«reality» by man through the institutionalization of roles, pat­
terns of social interaction, etc., and the objectivization of this 
reality, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The So­
cial Construction of Reality, New York: Doubleday & Co., 
1966, in particular pp. 50-63.
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This basic cognitive structure is resistant to 
change: new phenomena, new events and de­
velopments are assimilated and comprehended 
within this framework.1 The islanders of Greece, 
for example, have been seafarers for centuries, 
absenting themselves, in the past, for years at a 
time. Despite this, the definition of self in terms 
of family and village and its attendant respon­
sibilities and obligations remained intact. Concur­
rently, however, seamen have viewed themselves 
as sophisticated in the ways of the world, ac­
cumulating cultural artifacts and often adopting 
alien consumer goods. In the post World War II 
era, with rapid urbanization, the values of con­
sumerism have been assimilated with alacrity 
without this leading, however, to a breakdown of 
core concepts such as the psychological bonds of 
the family network and the dependence and def­
erence towards authority.2 Even the rapid entry 
of women into the labor in recent years is within 
the context of enhancing the family’s well-being 
and is frequently subject to control by the male 
members of the family.
The image of the Greeks, as Zorbas, as free 
spirits, is an illusion fostered by‘the readiness 
with which they criticize and demean authority, 
by their argumentativeness and by the multiplicity 
of views expressed on any subject. As already 
indicated, overt defiance of authority in Greece is 
psychologically out of bounds; verbal attacks are 
not harbingers of potential action. This very ar­
gumentativeness serves as psychological outlet for 
the frustrations that develop in working out 
«one’s fate», but they are «full of sound and 
fury, signifying nothing».3 Complaining does not 
aim at changing one’s condition, but rather at 
venting its curse. An open challenge to authority 
is both psychologically traumatic and jeopardizes 
one’s prospects for gain. Any such action, there­
fore, would constitute failure to fulfill one’s obliga­
tions. Paralysis in action coterminous with ver­
bal criticism reinforces the sense of powerless­
ness, the belief that «nothing can be done».4 The
1. For a discussion of assimilation and contrast see the 
experimental work by Muzafer Sherif, Social Interaction: Pro­
cess and Products, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967, pp. 
347-352. Sherif argues that the less ego-involved an individual 
is in a particular item the more easily it is assimilated and 
seen as consistent with one’s existing values whereas on ego- 
involved items slightly deviant positions are seen as markedly 
different from one’s views.
2. Ernestine Freidl, «The Role of Kinship in the Transmis­
sion of National Culture to Rural Villages in Mainland 
Greece», The American Anthropologist, 61, No. 1, February 
1959.
3. William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene 5, Line 
11.
4. Erroneous conclusions are frequently derived from lack
of familiarity with the interrelationships between specific be-
argumentativeness and the panoply of views ex­
pressed by Greeks is «couvenda», a form of ver­
bal game playing. It is frequently the peaceful al­
ternative to physical combat—an arena in which 
the combatants engage in a war of words. Fre­
quently, little attention is paid to the substance of 
the arguments. Rather, the object of «couvenda» 
is to outmanuveur, to outwit one’s opponent and 
emerge victorious.5 Given the Hobbesian view of 
the universe held by the Greeks, «couvenda», ar­
gumentativeness, is a mechanism of social control 
which restrains the potential violence inherent in 
a world of a man against man.
Among the Greek values addressing themselves 
to the fear of potential violence by imposing be­
havioral restraints is «isihia» (tranquility, quiet). 
«Isihia» should be striven for in the family, and 
in the political and social realm. The state of 
«isihia» implies that nothing disruptive has occur­
red in the established order of things and hence 
all is well. Psychologically, the disturbance of 
tranquility precipitates free floating anxiety of im­
pending doom and chaos.6 Children are admon­
ished not to question and to be quiet.7 Adults 
are censured and shunned if they disrupt estab­
lished routinized patterns and relationships in the 
family and in society. Striving for «isihia» clearly 
diminishes the prospects of violence. Yet it is not 
violence alone that is threatening and frightening, 
but any manifestation of disorder, conflict or dis­
sidence; they all lead to anarchy. A significant 
consequence of the high priority ascribed to 
«isihia», over and above other values such as 
equity and justice, is that manifestation of dissi­
dence from an established order, challenge the ex­
isting authority, and are perceived as opening the 
door to chaos necessitating suppression and re-
havior in particular cultures. For example, Daniel Lemer, The 
Passing of Traditional Society, Glencoe, New York, 1958, in 
which the author concludes, in the pilot study conducted in 
Greece, that the Greeks were modernized since they could 
empathize with political leaders, discuss politics and read 
newspapers extensively. From this he inferred that Greeks are 
participating citizens, ignoring the empirical fact that such be­
havior is not necessarily related to action, nor necessarily in­
dicative of a belief in the ability to act.
5.. Pollis, op. cit., p. 42.
6. The psychological fear of internal chaos as a determi­
nant of political attitudes particularly in the acceptance of the 
order provided by dictatorships are among the findings of a 
recent survey. Alexander T. Simos and R. Eugene Cash, 
Greek-American Attitudes toward the Greek Dictatorship in 
Progress, 1974 (unpublished manuscript).
7. An excellent poetic expression of Greek attitudes chal­
lenging authority and towards limiting one’s concerns to self 
interest is «To one who Doesn’t Resist», in a compilation of 
poetry on the Greek resistance during the Papadopoulos dic­
tatorship by Norman Weinstein, Let Us Be Greek, Philadel­
phia: Dorrance and Company, 1975, pp. 65-66.
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pression in order to forestall reforms and social 
change. Both the competition among conflicting 
interest groups advocated by the pluralists1 and 
the possible functionality of conflict as defined by 
Ccser2 are repudiated by the notion of «isihia» 
and the fear of disorder. Inevitably, strikes, de­
monstrations, rallies and marches organized by 
voluntary associations are perceived as disrupting 
the prevailing «peaceful» social order. By con­
trast, conflict among atomized groups operating 
within the framework of clientelism are not per­
ceived as disintegrative but as consistent with 
«isihia».
The valuing of «isihia», the commitment to sta­
bility and harmony is rooted in part in the 
Greek’s modem historical experience, an experi­
ence of periodic intense cleavage and internal vio­
lence; the Greek War of Independence of 1821-29 
accompanied by civil war; the overthrow of King 
Otto in 1863; the deep schism between Venizelists 
and Royalists during and after World War I; the 
civil war following World War II and the bruta­
lity accompanying the student uprising at the 
Polytechnic Institute in 1973 during the 
Papadopoulos dictatorship. Divisiveness and vio­
lence in modem Greece has been no more or less 
than that in many other societies, but in Greece 
these experiences have been interpreted and un­
derstood in terms of the Hobbesian nature of the 
world and the loss of morality, psychologically 
reinforcing the preexisting values of «isihia» and 
harmony. Hence the elimination of conflict, dis­
order and violence necessitates a reaffirmation of 
traditional values. In other societies, France in 
the 18th century for example, with a comparable 
historical experience of divisiveness and unrest 
resulted in the French Revolution. But this con­
flict was understood within an entirely different 
cognitive framework whereby the revolution was 
viewed in part as a result of class conflict.
Historically, religion, particularly as represented 
by the Greek Orthodox Church, has reinforced 
the psychological fear of disintegration leading to 
chaos, and has strengthened the cultural traits of 
obedience and deference towards authority. East­
ern Orthodoxy differentiates sharply between the 
life of the soul and that of the state and society. 
Social and political issues, therefore, ostensibly 
are of little concern to the Church. By contrast 
with the Catholic Church which periodically con­
1. As examples see Robert Dahl, Who Governs, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961; Modern Political
Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970; 
David Easton, A Framework of Political Analysis, New York: 
Prentice-Hall 1965.
2. Lewis A. Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social
Conflict, New York: The Free Press, 1967.
venes synods which address themselves to con­
temporary social issues resulting in Papal encycli­
cals and other pronouncements interpreting and 
applying Catholic dogma to a wide range of social 
and economic issues, the Eastern Orthodox 
Church has not convened a synod in eleven cen­
turies, since 787 A.D.3 The realm of the Church 
is spiritual and distinct from the lay concerns of 
the state. The Greek Church consequently, by 
maintaining a position of neutrality on non­
spiritual matters, has survived with its power in­
tact in all political regimes to date. Religion pro­
vides no guidelines on such matters as social jus­
tice and no body of ethics derived from its relig­
ious precepts. For the Greeks, religion is 
synonymous with the Church as an institution and 
the Church conducts liturgies and performs the 
sacraments and rituals around birth, baptism, 
marriage and death which are essential for in­
suring an individual’s salvation.4
Despite the official neutrality of the Church on 
matters pertaining to the political realm, it is a 
significant socializing structure which transmits 
traditional values and cultural patterns while its 
very neutrality lends the weight of religious sup­
port for the prevailing social and political 
system.5 The preachings of the Church intermesh 
with traditional attitudes of obedience and defer­
ence to established authority, while reinforcing 
the belief in man’s impotence. The equivalent to 
the secular notion of philotimo as a measure of 
equality is the Christian concept of equality be­
fore God which deflects from the psychological 
salience of political, economic and social inequal­
ity. In accord with Orthodox precepts, whatever 
is, whatever happens, is God’s will, and obedi­
ence and respect is due to the civil authorities; 
leaders of the social system which God has or­
dained. Just as the definition of self in traditional 
Greek culture is in terms of the extended family 
and not as an autonomous individual, thus man 
has no existence outside the Church. In turn, his 
existence as part of society is contingent on
3. In 1975 discussions were initiated by the Patriarchate in 
Constantinople to consider the convening of just such a 
synod. In November 1976 a pre-synodal meeting was held in 
Chambesy, Switzerland with representatives of 13 patriar­
chates and churches which agreed on an agenda for the forth­
coming Great Synodal meeting. No date was set for the meet­
ing.
4. There is little in the way of sociological analyses of the 
Greek Orthodox Church, see Anastase Tzanimis, «La 
Sociologie de la religion en Grèce», Social Compass, XXII, 
1975, 1, pp. 7-17.
5. Ibid.,p.9. «...aujourd’hui encore elle soit considérée 
comme le centre autour duquel c’est organisée la société grec­
que. L’Eglise est devenue |a cible des forces conservatrices, 
autant que réformatrices que la jugent incapable de jouer un 
rôle dans la formation de la nouvelle société grecque».
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adherence to the sacraments, and disobedience 
leads to excommunication; the religious counter­
part to the political exile imposed by political au­
thorities against political dissidents.1 A challenge 
to the authority of the Church,2 like a challenge 
to civil authority, is perceived as disrupting the 
social order, creating dissidence and conflict, dis­
turbing tranquility and leading to chaos. Thus, 
many Greeks who purport to have no religious 
convictions are nevertheless reluctant to challenge 
or attack the priesthood or the Church for fear of 
its social and political consequences.
The complex of values, attitudes and behavior 
discussed above—traditional group relatedness, 
deference towards authority, fatalism, patron-client 
relations—describe component elements of a polit­
ical culture at variance with that which ostensibly 
characterizes democratic politics. None of the 
Almond and Verba categories3 from which they 
attempt to derive the characteristics of a demo­
cratic political culture are applicable to Greece; it 
is not participant since its citizens do not articu­
late common interests in voluntary associations 
and it is not subject since its citizens are not 
concerned with the policy output of the system. 
Nor, however, are its citizens parochials, uncon­
cerned or inactive within the political system; 
they are highly politicized but the activity and the 
evaluation is in terms of personalized goals which 
they expect to achieve by «participating» indi­
vidually.
The political regimes of modern Greece have 
alternated between parliamentarianism and dic­
tatorship — military or civilian — in varying com­
binations with a monarchical or republican form 
of government. However, even when the political 
system is formally a parliamentary one, the sub­
stance of representative democratic government is 
frequently subverted in part because the cultural 
foundations upon which its implementation is de­
pendent are lacking. The absence of the concept 
of an individual qua individual, the perceived 
powerlessness of the individual to affect change, 
the deference accorded authority and the 
psychological fear of disorder and conflict, all mil­
1. The most recent instance of excommunication by the 
Church was that of the renowned writer Nikos Kazantzakis 
—the Church also refused to bury him when he died in 
1957— while the most recent internal exiles were those im­
posed by the military dictatorship between 1967 and 1974.
2. The financial and moral scandals that have periodically 
plagued the Church have been «explained» as indicative of the 
sinfullness of man which in no way detracts from the Truth of 
the priest’s teachings. On the other hand, institutional criti­
cism is practically non-existent and is considered a taboo.
3. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture,
Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1965 (paperback), see in
particular chapter I, pp. 1-44.
itate against the development or sustenance of a 
democratic polity.
democratic precepts and Greek politics
The difficulties encountered in the functioning of 
a democratic political system given traditional cul­
tural patterns are manifold. The absence of a well 
grounded conception of individual human rights 
has given to constitutional provisions or statutes 
providing for such rights a legal and political con­
notation; they are seen as rights granted by the 
authorities or the state, rather than as inherent or 
natural rights to be protected from encroachment 
by the state.4 Significantly the Greek language 
does not have a term for «privacy» or the «right 
to privacy». The Greek equivalent «aporito» 
(secret) has a different connotation and is rooted 
in a different conceptualization. Since language, 
as Sapir has argued,5 provides the cognitive 
framework for structuring reality, privacy has no 
reality in traditional Greek culture. The political 
implications of the absence of the concept 
«privacy» and the legalistic conception of human 
rights are clearly detrimental to sustaining a 
democratic system.
A complex of attitudes, values and beliefs im­
pede the functioning of democracy or even of a 
modem participant nation-state in Greece. The 
traditional belief in man’s impotence results in 
public policy being considered as beyond the 
scope of competence of the ordinary citizen; it is 
within the domain of affairs of state, while the 
individual restricts his concerns to jobs, licenses, 
etc., which may be obtained through a patron’s 
support. In turn, the submission and deference 
traditionally due authority reinforces a non- 
participatory culture, by contrast to authority in 
«modern» societies which is vested in institutional 
roles defined in terms of functional specificity. In 
representative governments, the authority of Pres­
idents, Premiers, deputies to legislative bodies, 
rests on the position they occupy and the func­
tions they perform. In principle at least, they are 
accountable to the electorate and subject to recall 
since sovereignty resides with the people. The au­
thoritarian tradition of Greek culture, buttressed
4. It is a myth to claim, as some Soviet specialists do, that 
it is a particular feature of communist constitutions such as 
the Soviet one, for the state to grant individual rights. Such a 
notion seems inherent in all societies, such as Greece, which 
lack any doctrine of the natural rights of man.
5. See Edward Sapir, «Language» in David G. Mandel­
baum (ed.), Selected Writings of Edward Sapir, 1947, pp. 
324-386, for a discussion of the relationship between language 
and culture.
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by religious precepts, is alien to the concept of 
popular sovereignty and alien to the notion of 
protection of minority rights. The basis of author­
ity in Greece is neither traditional, institutional 
nor charismatic.1 Those in whom authority is 
vested shifts in accordance with changes in 
socio-political systems. Authority remains diffuse, 
and is the recognition accorded those with power.
Supplementing the underlying conceptual and 
attitudinal dimensions of a democratic political 
culture are informal structures rooted in a social 
structure characterized by extensive differentia­
tion of roles precipitating the articulation of di­
verse interests. Dahl, extolling pluralism as the 
essence of a democratic polity, defines it as a 
condition in which competing elites, representing 
organized minorities atriculate and aggregate their 
interests within established rules of the game, al­
beit each elite may constitute the principal deci­
sion maker in those spheres of major concern to 
it.2 Although pluralism is hardly an accurate 
theoretical or philosophic formulation of the 
American political system, since it ignores the 
issue of how and by whom «relevant» and 
«significant» decisions are made and who exer­
cises power, it nevertheless is descriptive of the 
underlying precept of functionality as the organ­
izing principle of industrial states.
In Greece, functional interest groups, with the 
exception of a financial and economic oligarchy, 
have not been significant political actors. Domin­
ant are clientelist networks organized vertically 
from the local to the national level, while at the 
national level frequently shifting coalitions have 
formed political parties. In rural areas, patrons 
(deputies in the legislature) satisfy the personal­
ized demands of their clients, while the clients 
remain loyal and insure the patron’s reelection. 
Patron-client relations are face to face relations 
and engender a host of psychological bonds. In 
urban centers patron-client relations persist, albeit 
the networks are more complex and, given the 
impossibility of face to face relations between 
voter and representative,3 involve more inter­
mediaries. The greater impersonality of urban 
centers in conjunction with socio-economic 
changes nevertheless seem to be producing a ten­
dency, particularly in Athens, to vote in terms of 
«national» party leader, party label, or principles.
1. This typology was developed by Max Weber in The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York: The 
Free Press, 1947, pp. 329-63.
2. Dahl, Who Governs.
3. The only article in Greek discussing political clientelism
this writer has seen is A. G. Kosmopoulos, «Skhesis
Prostasias», Epitheorisis Koinonikon Erevnon, pp. 413-424,
Athens: National Center of Social Research, No. 25, 1975.
By contrast to a society characterized by politi­
cal clientelism, modem societies, regardless of 
ideological foundations, tend to be organized hor­
izontally in associational interest groups repres­
enting the concerns and shared goals of their 
socio-economic interests. In representative 
governments, reelection is in part contingent on 
positions taken on issues and/or party platforms. 
In Greece, deputies to the «Vouli» are concerned 
with building clientelist networks independent of 
issues or politics, in order to insure their reelec­
tion. Bureaucrats on the other hand have been 
concerned with extending or withholding favors, 
impeding or facilitating requests for favors, 
depending on who is and is not a «client», rather 
than applying laws and regulations efficiently and 
impartially.4 Thus, the parliamentary system of 
Greece, from the end of World War II until 1967, 
and after a period of dictatorial rule, again begin­
ning in 1974, has remained a formal institutional 
framework subverted in part by traditional cultural 
patterns. Indicative of the anti-pluralist orientation 
towards democracy is Premier Karamanlis’ state­
ment to the Greek Vouli on June 12, 1976 that 
organized minorities are antidemocratic.5
Some analysts attribute functionality to clien­
telist politics in developing societies, in that they 
integrate states characterized by significant cleav­
ages, be they cultural, ethnic, tribal or religious.6 
Greece has been free of these divisions, but his­
torically village and provincial identity and loyalty 
has predominated over national relatedness and 
loyalty. Thus, a Greek identified himself first as a 
member of a particular extended family and sec­
ondly as 'a member of a particular village. Tradi­
tionally, neighboring villages were viewed as 
«kseni» who were negatively stereotyped. Clien­
telist politics in Greece, rather than serving as an 
integrative factor has tended to further fragment 
society. It has pitted extended family against ex­
tended family, village against village and province 
against province. The reinforcement of provincial 
loyalties which clientelism fosters and per­
sonalized politics, in addition, is dysfunctional 
vis-a-vis the emergence of national level leader­
ship. Governance by the leaders of any coalition 
of political clientelist networks is by definition
4. This is not to question the validity of analyses of the 
bureaucratic state in industrial societies. Rather it is contend­
ed that the norms governing bureaucratic behavior in Greece, 
are at variance with those industrialized societies.
5. Speech by Constantine Karamanlis, 12 June 1976, Mi­
nutes of the Vouli, pp. 5443 in which he appealed to the 
majority to mobilize against minority demands.
6. Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, «Political Clien­
telism and Political Development», Comparative Politics, 
January 1971, Voi. 4, No. 2.
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perceived as excluding members of the defeated 
clientelist networks from the rewards and benefits 
derived from the exercise of power. Such a per­
ception is further strengthened given the failure to 
differentiate between institutional roles and the 
persons occupying these posts on the part of both 
citizens and the leaders. It should be noted that 
the system of reciprocal obligations, albeit bet­
ween individuals possessed of unequal resources, 
underpinning an effective patron-client system, is 
in turn rooted in Greek ethics which has a differ­
ent standard of ethical behavior towards strangers 
and towards those with whom one personally 
«relates».
Despite the disintegrative forces of Greek soci­
ety several factors at the individual, social, 
psychological, cultural and ideological levels, his­
torically have coalesced to avert disintegration. In 
the first place Greek nationalist ideology—an 
amalgam of the intellectual superiority of ancient 
Greece and the power and geographic expanse of 
the Byzantine Empire—was a significant unifying 
force for nearly a century. Efforts to recreate 
Byzantium, to fulfill the Megali Idea, dominated 
Greek policy for nearly a century until its col­
lapse with the defeat of Greek troops in Asia 
Minor by Kemal Ataturk’s forces in 1922. Until 
then, irredentism served as a superordinate goal 
unifying the Greeks while deflecting from domes­
tic issues and forestalling the fragmentation of 
society.1 Subsequent efforts to redefine nation­
alist ideology, however, failed to create a unify­
ing symbol. The shift of focus from the exter­
nal goals embodied in the Megali Idea to internal 
criteria defining the specifics of the uniqueness 
and superiority of Greeks—Metaxas’ fascism, 
the «ethnikofrones» of the Civil War and post 
Civil War period, and Papadopoulos’ Greece of 
Christian Greeks—all used political criteria, and 
by pitting Greek against Greek, failed as an 
integrative force.
Components of Greek nationalist ideology and 
the goals derived from it, have been frequently 
articulated. Less clearly evident, however, are the 
cosmological underpinnings of Greek society—the 
frequently inarticulated givens. The converse of 
Greek divisiveness and the fear of chaos, and 
closely intertwined with them, is an ideology of 
harmony that transcends cleavages and forestalls 
disintegration. From this perspective unity based 
on nationalist ideology is only one element, which 
itself emanates in part from a basic world view.
1. See Adamantia Pollis, The Megali Idea: A Study of 
Greek Nationalism (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation), The 
Johns Hopkins University, 1958, for a discussion of the role 
of the Megali Idea as an integrative force.
Thus, although on one level the relations of man 
to man are Hobbesian, the brutality that such a 
state of nature prescribes is averted by the prin­
ciples of harmony which govern the universe and 
contain potential violence. This principle of har­
mony is ordained by God and in the secular is 
manifest in the prevailing social order. It is man’s 
duty to uphold this order and to avoid actions to 
the contrary which risk social disorganization and 
chaos. Thus, the citizen’s responsibility is obedi­
ence and acquiescence to the political authorities 
while the responsibility of the authorities is to 
preserve the social order, provide tranquility and 
prevent dissidence and disorder.
The conjunction of the ideological, normative 
and behavioral aspects of Greek society thus pro­
vides a tenuous cohesion, but one fraught with 
tensions and stresses; they bespeak of an au­
thoritarian society resistant to social change. The 
empirical realities, however, are that Greece, like 
all societies, is not static and it is unlikely that 
the status quo and the paradigm on which it is 
based can continue indefinitely to incorporate and 
vitiate change without an eventual destruction of 
the paradigm itself. In order to deter social 
change, it becomes necessary to deny the exis­
tence of pressing social and economic issues, to 
repress expressions of discontent, and to dismiss 
pressures for reform as the acts of a few mali­
cious men intent on destroying the harmony 
which governs society. The relevance of social 
stratification is denied while the possibility of 
class conflict is repudiated. The organic unity im­
plicit in the identity of Church and religion, of the 
nation and the people, and of the ideology of 
harmony, precludes the legitimate recognition of 
conflicting functional interests. Only interests ex­
pressed within patron-client networks are legiti­
mate and non-threatening to the prevailing social 
order. In western Europe and the United States, 
the philosophy of pluralism is contingent on 
recognition of the necessity to reconcile conflict­
ing socio-economic interests, while in the east 
European socialist states, rule by the working 
class is the official ideology. In Greece, neither 
ideological model is operative, but rather a non­
modern conception of society which repudiates 
the very existence of contemporary socio­
economic realities.
The dominant Greek ideology of harmony and 
unity, the authoritarian foundations of Greek soc­
iety and the anti-modern orientation of the Greek 
elites have either thwarted social, economic and 
political change or have deflected their potential 
for radical transformation by channeling them 
into traditional cultural patterns and thus vitiating 
their impact. Striking is a comparison with
10
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Greece’s northern neighbor Bulgaria which Greeks 
have viewed as a «barbarie» underdeveloped coun­
try and which, measured by any index of econom­
ic development, lagged significantly behind Greece 
prior to World War II. Bulgaria today, outstrips 
Greece in terms of industrialization and rate of 
economic growth.1 Modernization and develop­
ment in Bulgaria, however, was accompanied by 
radical changes in social structure, power dis­
tribution and an altered ideology. In Greece, the 
dominant ideology and its implementors, the rul­
ing elites, are resistant to social change, perceiv­
ing it as destructive of the values of civilization 
and a threat to their power. Nationalist ideology 
harkens back to a mythical golden past as the 
ideal which contemporary Greeks should strive to 
emulate. The ideology of change and progress, so 
prevalent in the United States has had no roots in 
Greece.
pressures for social change
The traditionalism of Greek culture, society and 
politics., described in the previous pages is partial 
however, and does not deal with contradictory 
empirical phenomena indicative of significant so­
cial change. The static quality of the underpin­
nings of Greek society have been subjected to 
pressures emanating from socio-economic devel­
opments, changing values and the dissemination 
of alternative ideologies. Some changes that have 
taken place have been incorporated within the 
prevailing ideology, some have not been per­
ceived as threatening to the prevailing social 
order, whereas others have posed and continue to 
pose a significant threat. The divisiveness, for ex­
ample, engendered by the nationalist ideologies of 
recent decades has in part been compensated for 
by attitudinal changes whereby the Greek nation, 
rather than the village has become a significant 
reference group. Gradually, socialization via the 
educational system, controlled from the center, 
Athens, and intensely nationalistic, has had an 
impact. Of greater import perhaps has been rapid 
urbanization in the post World War II era, con­
comitant with retention of familial ties which link 
rural to urban inhabitants, thus transmitting urban 
values and concepts, including Greekness, to the 
provinces.2 Greek emigration, in recent years as
1. The average rate of growth for Bulgaria from 1960 to 
1970 was 8.2% while for Greece it was 7.6%, Statistical Year­
book, United Nations, 1973.
2. Friedl, op. cit.; see also Adamantia Pollis, «Social
Change and Nationhood», The Massachusetts Review, Voi. 9,
No. 1, Winter 1968, pp. 126-127.
workers to western Europe, has further contrib­
uted to the shift towards the Greek nation as a 
primary reference group. The societies in which 
émigrés live identify them as Greek; the primacy 
of village loyalties diminishes. The émigrés in 
turn have contributed to the dissemination of the 
notion of Greekness among their kin in the vil­
lages. This shift in reference group to the nation 
clearly does not threaten the philosophic under­
pinning of Greek society. If anything, it 
strengthens the notion of the organic unity of the 
Greek nation.3
In other areas, however, the traditional ideol­
ogy and efforts to incorporate change into the 
status quo has been inadequate and incapable of 
coping with contemporary social and economic is­
sues. Thus, periodically in modem Greek history, 
pressures for economic, social and political re­
forms have erupted which have threatened the 
foundations of the social and political system 
grounded in the notion of harmony and organic 
unity. The informal institutional framework of the 
Greek polity, traditionally political clientelism, it­
self has been modified, so that organized interest 
groups, for example, disavowed as incompatible 
with the underlying precepts of the unity of the 
Greek nation, have been formed many sectors of 
Greek society. Thus, paralleling the vertically or­
ganized patron-client networks representing 
atomized interests, are horizontally organized 
functional interests. Voluntary associations rep­
resenting a complex of functional interests or 
single issues, by their claim to autonomy and in­
dependent action and their articulation of de­
mands in competition or conflict with those of 
other groups, «legitimize» conflict and repudiate 
harmony as the guiding principle of society. The 
survival of voluntary associations as autonomous 
organizations in Greece however, has often en­
countered nearly insurmountable obstacles, given 
the proclivity of the state and its spokesmen, 
consistent with traditional ideology, to covert 
them into state organs which further enhance and 
reinforce the conception of organic unity. 4 Es­
tablished institutional interests by contrast, such 
as the Church and the armed forces, are viewed
3. For a discussion of the prospects for the emergence of 
the organic notion leading to a dictatorship, see Pollis, 
«Political Implications of the Modem Greek Concept of Self», 
p. 44.
4. Illustrative is the history of the Greek Confederation of 
Labor which has been largely controlled and dominated by the 
Ministry of Labor and which is the only officially recognized 
Greek labor union. Little has been written on the Greek labor 
movement. For some discussion of manipulation and control 
of trade unions by the Greek state and the United States in 
the post World War II period, see Christos Jecchinis, Trade 
Unionism in Greece, Chicago, Roosevelt University, 1967.
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as an integral part of the existing social order and 
are not conceptualized as interests in actual or 
potential conflict with the welfare and integration 
of society.
An analysis of the Greek political system using 
political clientelism as the explanatory variable 
even when adapted to the particularities of Greek 
political culture and ideology, thus leaves unex­
plained many aspects of Greek politics. A more 
fundamental limitation of an analysis based on 
political clientelism than the issue of voluntary 
associations, however, is its inability to account 
for the repeated emergence of alternative ideolog­
ical formations which have challenged the official 
ideology upon which the existing social order has 
been premised. Political clubs, espousing a vari­
ety of Marxist and non-Marxist views, and mass 
based ideological political parties have been a re­
curring phenomenon in modem Greece. By ig­
noring such developments and the responses to 
them by the existent elites, clientelisi analysis is in­
capable of accounting for severe conflicts such as 
the civil war during 1946-49 or the military dicta­
torship from 1967-74.
The most dramatic explosion of violence in re­
cent history was the civil war1 following World 
War II, which although made possible by the so­
cial disorganization accompanying World War II 
and the Nazi occupation, nevertheless was rooted 
in decades of pressures for reform and/or revo­
lution. Decades prior to World War II, towards 
the end of the 19th century and the beginning of 
the 20th, incipient changes in Greek social struc­
ture occurred with the rise of a small indigenous 
bourgeoisie. Simultaneously, all varieties of Marx­
ist, anarchist and syndicalist thought appeared 
among Greek intellectuals, while workers’ organi 
zations appeared in Patras, Pireaus and 
Salonica. 2 In 1908 a reform socialist group was 
advocating reorganization and reform of the 
educational system, the electoral system, agricul­
ture and local and national administration, while 
proposing workers’ benefits and the introduction 
of a merit system. 3 Strikes, demonstrations and
1. At present the Greek conservatives themselves admit 
that it was a civil war and.not an «antartopolemos». See, for 
example, statements by the former leader of the conservative 
party, ERE, Panayotis Canellopoulos, Istorika Dokimia 
(Historical Essays), Athens, 1975, p. 22. Nor do they any 
longer contend in the face of massive evidence to the contrary 
that the civil war was Soviet inspired and supplied. See D. 
George Kousoulos, Revolution and Defeat, Oxford University 
Press, 1965, pp. 191 ff, which was probably the first reluctant 
admission by a Greek that the civil war was not Soviet in­
spired given the British-Soviet agreement on the Balkans.
2. Yannis Kordatos, I Istoria tou Ellinikou Ergatikou 
Kinimatos (History of the Greek Labor Movement), 3rd edi­
tion, Athens: Boukoumani, 1972.
3. For a compilation of the speeches, documents and
rallies among workers, even farmers, erupted de­
manding either redress of specific grievances or 
basic reforms. The military coup of 1909 which 
brought Eleftherios Venizelos to power was in part 
a repudiation of the old politics, and a move on 
the part of an incipient middle class to gain 
power. But the ferment for reform, modernization 
and development, a consequence of a degree of 
economic development in Greece comparable to 
the early stages of industrialization manifested by 
western European countries a century earlier, and 
a commitment of intellectuals to change, was 
stillborn. Agitation and dissidence in the 1930s 
ended with the Metaxas dictatorship, a dictatorship 
parroting the fascist ideological doctrines of Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy.
In the late 1950s and 60s and again in the mid­
dle 70s, pressures for essentially the same re­
forms have been and are still voiced; the indige­
nous middle class has remained embryonic; the 
labor movement has remained weak and largely 
state controlled; politics have remained personal­
ized; the bureaucracy inefficient and clientelisi; 
the educational system archaic. If anything, social 
and economic issues by the second half of the 
20th century have become more intense and more 
extensive. The rapid urbanization, particularly in 
Athens and the consequent depletion of rural 
areas, the emigration of workers to Europe, par­
ticularly West Germany, the rapid expansion of 
tourism and the privileged investments of multina­
tional corporations have further dramatized 
Greece’s position on the periphery of indus­
trialized western Europe, and her dependence on 
the West, further exacerbating social dislocation. 
These recent socio-economic changes, while ac­
companied by the widespread assimilation of the 
values of consumerism have also been accom­
panied by a worsened maldistribution of in­
come.4 Clearly such conditions at a minimum 
portend continued pressures for reform.
The periodic dissidence expressed in Greece by 
various sectors of society, are evidence of poten­
tiality for the repudiation of the issueless politics 
of clientelism, and of an erosion of the ideology
proposals of Alexandras Papanastasiou, see Meletai (Studies), 
Athens, 1969.
4. The first study including material on distribution of in­
come in Greece is Dionysios Karageorgas, «The Distribution 
of the Tax Burden by Income Groups in Greece» in The 
Economic Journal, June 1973, Voi. 83, pp. 436-448. This arti­
cle deals with data as of 1964. For indications that the dis­
tribution of income has worsened since then, see Dionysios 
Karageorgas, «I Ikonomikes Sinepies Tis Stratiotikis 
Diktatorias» (The Economic Consequences of Military 
Dictatorship) in Anti, Athens, Period II, 1, September 7, 1974, 
pp. 41-46.
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of harmony and organic unity. Although the rev­
olutionary attempt to institute radical change 
during the civil war failed for a multiplicity of 
reasons, leftist ideology has retained a stronghold 
on a significant segment of the Greek citizenry.1 
In 1958, EDA, the legal leftist political party, 
eight years after the end of the civil war, polled 
over 24% of the vote, while in the first elections 
in November 1974 after the collapse of the Ioan- 
nides dictatorship, the combined vote of all leftist 
political parties exceeded 20%. 2 In addition to 
those who express their discontent with the pre­
vailing social order and its ideological foundations 
through the ballot, there are pressures of moder­
nizing reforms (organizational and programmatic) 
within the very political parties whose traditional 
strength has depended upon the functioning of 
political clientelism. Comparable pressures are 
being exerted for reform and restructuring within 
the educational system, the bureaucracy and the 
labor unions.
Thus, there is empirical evidence of underlying 
discontent in Greece which periodically erupts, 
concurrent with evidence of the gradual develop­
ment of a set of attitudes, values and belief sys­
tems at variance with traditional cultural patterns 
and with the ideology of organic unity. Class and 
associational interests have been attempting to as­
sert themselves; there is a growing awareness that 
common action by a class or functional group can 
further its interests as a whole, rather than efforts 
at individual action geared towards individual 
(family) advancement at the expense of others 
similarly situated. Some workers * some students, 
some intellectuals, some professionals, some 
small scale businessmen, some women, are de­
manding participation in the decision-making pro­
cesses, and are assimilating and espousing a range 
of alternative frameworks for the understanding of 
reality and hence are propounding new answers 
for unsolved issues and problems.
The military dictatorship that governed Greece 
from 1967-1974 can be viewed from one perspec­
tive as an attempt to preserve and protect tradi­
tion against the onslaught of change. The 
Papadopoulos-Ioannides dictatorship with its 
slogan of «Greece of Cristian Greeks» was an at­
tempt to forcibly impose and strengthen the past
1. Jean Meynaud, Les Forces Politiques en Grèce, 
Lausanne, Etudes de Science Politique, 1965, p. 44,«...en 
principe, aussi dans Γ ordre des fait, patronage et idéologie ne 
sont pas incompatibles».
2. This is not to say that some voters who voted for leftist 
parties, particularly PASOK, were not voting in terms of tra­
ditional patron-client relationships independent of ideological is­
sues. In part this is compensated for by voters in the other
political parties who voted in terms of issues.
and its ostensible virtues. Its ideology, if the re­
gime could be said to have had an ideology,3 
was a revival and reaffirmation of the values of 
discipline, order, obedience, family virtue and 
moral purity; its mission was to preserve 
«civilization», which was embodied in the Greek 
nation, form the onslaught of communism and the 
decadent democracies of the west. Whatever else 
military rule represented and whatever economic 
interests it furthered, its rationale was rooted in 
values and beliefs indigenous to traditional Greek 
culture.
Following the return to parliamentary rule with 
the collapse of the Ioannides regime in 1974 as a 
result of the fiasco of the Cyprus coup, the goal 
of the new rulers of Greece became one of 
restoration—not reform, not change, not
modernization—but a return to the status quo 
ante; a reaffirmation of the traditional official 
ideology, a perpetuation of the traditional social 
structure and of the existing socio-economic sys­
tem, but now within a constitutional framework. 
Within two years, popular expectations that 
Greece had entered an era of renovation and 
progress were shattered as the country returned 
to «normalcy», to politics as usual. But the stress­
es on the political system remain, the tensions 
and the discontent are as great as ever and the 
cleavage between those who wield power and the 
mass of people is widening. Accomodation and 
reconciliation is not feasible when the official 
ideology and the policies of the government deny 
the very existence of opposition and withhold 
«legitimacy» from dissident groups representing 
the forces of change.
In summary, to contend that political clien­
telism is the determining variable explanatory of 
Greek politics is simplistic, ignores empirical evi­
dence that does not fit the framework, and is in­
capable of accounting for pressures for change, 
reform and modernization or for such develop­
ments as civil war and military coups. Patron- 
client relations is a way of life for a large seg­
ment of the Greek citizenry, but at some level, 
policy decisions are made in both the foreign and 
domestic spheres, for which clientelism can not 
provide an analysis or an explanation. Since the 
citizenry is excluded from participation in the 
processes of decision making, an analysis of elite 
behavior and the relationship between the Greek
3. «To attempt to define a coherent ideology underlying 
the actions of the Greek military regine is a somewhat futile 
exercise for the very good reason that such an ideology sim­
ply does not exist». Richard Clogg, «The Ideology of the 
Revolution of 21 April 1967’» in Richard Clogg and George 
Yannopoulos, Greece under Military Rule, New York: Basic 
Books, 1972, p. 36.
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elites and foreign actors becomes crucial for a full­
er understanding of the Greek political system.1 
The persistence of traditional cultural patterns 
and political clientelism in the face of pressures 
for change, in large measure has been a conse­
quence of control of the state apparatus, of the 
structures of socialization, of the levers of pow­
ers, by an anti-modem elite dependent on foreign 
interests and resistant to reform. It appears, by 
contrast to much of the modernization literature.
1. A study of Greek elites, and their internal policies for 
maintaining themselves in power largely by reinforcing 
traditionalism, and their relationship as clients to foreign pow­
ers is discussed in Adamantia Pollis, «Deterrents to Moderni­
zation in Greece: Limits of Political Clientelism», paper pre­
sented to the symposium on «Forces Shaping Modem Greece» 
sponsored by the Modem Greek Studies Association, 
November 11, 1973, Columbia University.
that Greece is characterized by a «modem» elite 
that is not modernizing.
An analysis of the Greek elites—the armed 
forces, the church hierarchy, the financial and 
economic oligarchy and the political elite—the in­
terrelationship among them and the mechanisms 
employed for perpetuating their rule is essential 
for an understanding of the deterrents to change 
in Greece and hence of the dynamics of Greek 
politics. In turn, efforts to scrutinize Greek poli­
tics and the tension between stagnation and 
change, by contrast to much of the theoretical 
formulations in comparative politics, must be 
placed within an international context. Greece, 
like all small dependent states, is not an au­
tonomous political entity, regardless of its legal 
status, and any analysis of its political system 
must incorporate as an integral part of such an 
analysis the economic and political inputs from 
outside its borders.
14
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:03:46 |
